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RECENT DECISIONS
remains unanswered."' In order to effect an equitable solu-
tion, it appears necessary to provide the ward with such
a right where the guardian is personally at fault.
JON HARLAN LIVEZEY
Recent Decisions
Constitutional Law - Proof Necessary To Show Advo-
cating Forcible Overthrow Of Government Under The
Smith Act. Hellman v. U. S., 298 F. 2d 810 (9th Cir. 1962).
The defendant was a member of the Communist Party and
served as an organizer for the states of Montana and Idaho.
Among other things, he taught in Party schools, recruited
members, participated in the Party underground and dis-
tributed Party literature. Defendant was convicted for
violation of the membership clause of the Smith Act [18
U.S.C.A. § 2385, 3]. On appeal, defendant contended that
the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The
United States Court of Appeals in reversing, held that the
evidence was insufficient to support the indispensable find-
ing, that, during the period covered by the indictment, the
defendant personally had the specific intent to bring about
the violent overthrow of the government "as speedily as
circumstances would permit," relying on Scales v. U.S.,
367 U.S. 203 (1961). Scales, supra, 220, 252, sustained an
instruction of the trial court which stated that two ele-
ments must be proved to convict under the membership
clause: First, it is necessary to prove that a society, group
or assembly of persons advocated the violent overthrow of
the government, in the sense of present advocacy to action
to accomplish the end at least as soon as it determined cir-
cumstances were propitious; and Second, that defendant
was an active member of the society (and not merely a
nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical member)
with knowledge of the organization's illegal advocacy and
a specific intent to bring about violent overthrow of the
government at some propitious time at the society's com-
mand. [The instant case's requirement of "as speedily as
circumstances would permit" would seem to go beyond the
holding of the Scales case, although this did not control the
result.]
"13 ScoTT, TRUSTS (2d ed. 1956) § 247, p. 1977. That question and the
problem of recovery by the ward against the guardian for mismanagement
are beyond the scope of this note.
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In the instant case defendant challenged the sufficiency
of the evidence in regard to both of these elements. The
court assumed that the record supported the jury finding
that, during the period covered by the indictment, the Com-
munist Party advocated the violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment, and furthermore that defendant was an active
member of the Party with personal knowledge of the
Party's illegal advocacy. However, the court stated that
the evidence must prove that the defendant personally had
illegal intent, and that without proof of such intent a con-
viction could not stand, notwithstanding proof of the as-
sumed facts. With specific reference to the factor of specific
intent to bring about the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment, see Scales, supra, 229 (that there must be "clear
proof") and see also Killian v. U.S., 368 U.S. 231,266 (1961).
In the instant case, as in Scales, supra, 229, the Communist
Party was shown to have legal as well as assumed illegal
aims. The court therefore noted that an active member
with knowledge of both the legal and illegal aims might
personally intend to carry out only the legal objectives;
and that to allow an inference of personal illegal intent
from the factors of active membership and knowledge of
the illegal aims of the Party might result in the impair-
ment of legitimate political expression or association. In
the Scales case there was testimony that the defendant re-
peatedly made statements to individuals that were clearly
intended to reflect the defendant's personal views in favor
of violent overthrow of the government at the first oppor-
tunity; however, in the instant case the court found no such
evidence in the entire record. For further information see:
75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 104 et. seq. (1961); 37 Notre Dame
Lawyer 239 (1961); 15 Vand. L. Rev. 279 (1961). With
regard to the membership clause of the Smith Act see Noto
v. U.S., 367 U.S. 290 (1961) and the cases therein cited.
Constitutional Law - Violation Of Due Process Of Law
By Official Denial Of Blood Test. In Re Martin, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 833, 374 P. 2d 801 (1962). Upon his arrest for operating
a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, petitioner requested
the "booking" officer for a blood test, petitioner to bear the
expense, but his request was refused. Released within
thirty minutes, petitioner attempted to obtain a test at two
hospitals but was informed such a test could only be given
by authority of the police department. Petitioner alleged
that his wife telephoned requesting said authorization, but
the request was denied. At trial, petitioner was convicted
despite a claimed violation of due process of law. In re-
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versing, the Supreme Court of California held that where
duly constituted authorities, by their actions or regulations,
hamper or interfere with reasonable and sincere efforts of
an accused to obtain evidence necessary for his defense,
such action is analogous to suppression of evidence and
violative of due process of law. See Cal. Const. Art. I § 13;
In Re Newbern, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 1 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1959).
The court reasoned that, while an arresting officer is
not under an affirmative constitutional duty to assure that
accused obtains a timely blood test (In Re Koehne, 54 Cal.
App. 2d 757, 8 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1960)) an interference, by
the constituted authorities, with the right to seek such tests
will constitute a violation of due process. As provided in
4 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 35, § 100(g), an ar-
resting officer has a duty to advise accused that he may,
but need not, submit himself to such a test. Section 100 (e)
of Article 35 grants the accused permission to have his
personal physician administer a test in addition to the one
administered at the direction of the police officer. Unlike
the California ruling, it appears that such permission is
contingent upon submission to prior testing by the police.
For further information, see ANNO. 78 A.L.R. 2d 905
(1961); cf. 17 Md. L. Rev. 193 (1957).
Domestic Relations - Alimony Where Wife Elects To
Obtain Divorce Rather Than Annulment. Clayton v.
Clayton, 231 Md. 74, 188 A. 2d 550 (1963). Defendant hus-
band entered into bigamous marriage with plaintiff "wife,"
the prior marriage being known only to him. Plaintiff sued
for divorce under 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 24, which
provides that Maryland courts "may decree a divorce a
vinculo matrimonii ... for any cause which by the laws
of this State, render a marriage null and void ab initio;
." Plaintiff could have had the marriage annulled at
equity under 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 22. The trial
court granted plaintiff a divorce a vinculo matrimonii and
awarded her alimony and support for a minor child, but
conceded that had plaintiff obtained an annulment she
would not have been entitled to alimony (Baltimore City
Circuit Court No. 2, Case No. 92993-B (1962)). The Court
of Appeals held that bigamy was a cause which rendered a
marriage void ab initio and, having elected to obtain a
divorce a vinculo matrimonii rather than seeking an annul-
ment, plaintiff was entitled to alimony.
It is generally recognized, in the absence of a statute,
that no permanent alimony may be awarded in a suit for
annulment of a marriage. See 3 NELSON, DIVORCE ANiD AN-
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NULMENT (2d ed. 1945) § 31.56, 345; 15 M.L.E., Marriage,§ 56; ANNO. 54 A.L.R. 2d 1410 (1957). The Maryland Court
of Appeals has stated, in dictum, that "alimony is not an
incident to, and cannot be predicated upon, or granted in
consequence of, an annulment of marriage." Yake v. Yake,
170 Md. 75, 78, 183 A. 555 (1936). The theory advanced in
support of this rule is that since permanent alimony is
based on the husband's duty to support, it is felt there can
be no such duty where no valid marriage ever arose. See
NELSON, supra, § 31.56, p. 345; 35 AM. JuR., Marriage, § 71;
AxNo. 54 A.L.R. 2d 1410 (1957). The defendant in the
instant case, contended that the same reasoning should
apply where a divorce is decreed on the ground that the
marriage is null and void ab initio. However, the Maryland
Court of Appeals rejected this contention since under the
provisions of 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 3, "where a
divorce is decreed, alimony may be awarded." See also:
MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOmESTIc RELATIONS (1931) §§ 97-
98; 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1931) § 53; 8
M.L.E., Divorce, § 123; 12 M.L.E. 117, Husband and Wife,
§ 111.
Domestic Relations - Effect Of A Bigamous Marriage
On Illegitimate Children. Sybert v. Griffin, et al., Howard
County Circuit Court, No. 5875 Equity (October 17, 1962).
Decedent died intestate on November 26, 1960 leaving cer-
tain real and personal property in Howard County. Re-
spondent filed a claim against complainant-administrator
for an interest in the estate for her three children, contend-
ing they were decedent's legitimate children. Decedent
began cohabitation with respondent in approximately 1948,
while the latter was separated from her husband. As a
result of this meretricious relationship three children were
born - Adam in 1951, Solomon in 1955 and Gloria in 1956.
Prior to the birth of the latter, respondent and decedent
were married, although both parties knew of respondent's
subsisting marriage. All three children had been acknowl-
edged by decedent. 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 151, pro-
vides: "Any children born of parents who have been the
subject of a marriage ceremony with each other shall be
deemed to be the legitimate issue of such parents, whether
or not it is subsequently determined or can be determined,
that the marriage is, or might be, legally invalid because
of the prior marital status of one of the parents." The
Court held that the child born subsequent to the marriage
was the legitimate child of decedent. By reading 8 MD.
CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 151 in conjunction with 4 MD. CODE
284
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(1957) Art. 46, § 6, ("If any man shall have a child or chil-
dren by a woman whom he shall afterwards marry, such
child or children, if acknowledged by the man shall, in
virtue of such marriage and acknowledgement, be hereby
legitimated and capable in law to inherit and transmit in-
heritance as if born in wedlock.") the court further held
that the two acknowledged children born prior to the
invalid marriage were the legitimate children of the dece-
dent. For further discussion see: In re Estate of Weeast, 72
N.J. Super. 325, 178 A. 2d 113 (1962) treated as a Recent
Decision in 22 Md. L. Rev. 361 (1962).
Ethics - "Self-Laudation" Within The Meaning Of
Canon 27. Florida Bar v. Nichols, 31 L.W. 2446 (Fla. Sup.
Ct. 1963). Defendant attorney was approached by a news-
paper concerning a news story about him, his law practice
and his recently constructed office building. Defendant
submitted to an interview and an essentially biographical
article was published. The article described the manner
in which defendant's office was organized and how cases
were handled, comments of judges and lawyers about his
methods and results accomplished for his clients, and the
time that defendant spent in lecturing legal associations
about his organization and method of handling negligence
cases. As a result of the publication, disciplinary proceed-
ings were instituted against the defendant. Canon 27 pro-
hibits, "Indirect advertisements for professional employ-
ment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments,
or procuring his photograph to be published in connection
with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's posi-
tion, and all other like self-laudation. . . ." [Emphasis
supplied.] The Supreme Court of Florida, in defining "self-
laudation" as conduct which offends the traditions and
lowers the tone of the profession, held that defendant had
not violated Canon 27 by submitting to an interview by a
representative of news media and by allowing publication
of an article which was primarily a "news story" and "bio-
graphical" in nature. While conceding that Canon 27 does
not prohibit an attorney from submitting to a requested
interview, the dissent stated the Canon requires an attor-
ney, who does submit to such an interview, to reserve the
privilege to review an article before publication, and, if he
fails to do this and the article offends the Canon, the at-
torney will be subject to disciplinary action. For further
1963]
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information see: A.B.A., Opinions, Committee On Pro-
fessional Ethics And Grievances (1957) Canon 27, p. 19,
et. seq.; 7 AM. JuR. 2d, Attorneys At Law, § 43; ANNO. 39
A.L.R. 2d 1055 (1955).
Evidence - Defendant In Rape Prosecution Entitled To
Have Blood Grouping Test Taken. People v. Tashman,
233 N.Y.S. 2d 744 (1962). Defendant was charged with
statutory rape of a girl who, at preliminary examination,
testified she had never had sexual intercourse with any
person other than defendant. Defendant moved for an
order to have blood grouping tests taken of complainant,
her child and himself. A New York statute provided for
use of blood tests in criminal cases where "it shall be rele-
vant . . . to determine parentage of any child" (Code of
Crim. Proc. § 684-a). While conceding that paternity of
the child was not in issue in this proceeding (as, indeed,
the fact of sexual relations with others would not be a
defense to a charge of statutory rape) and without dis-
cussing whether the use of such blood tests would involve
extrinsic impeachment on a collateral issue, the Supreme
Court, Criminal Term, Kings Co., Part I held that in the
prosecution of an offense wherein the credibility of the
complainant is of "utmost importance" and where the cor-
roborative evidence connecting the defendant with the
crime is entirely circumstantial, evidence which would
exclude the defendant as a possible father of the child is
competent and relevant on the issue of complainant's credi-
bility. In accord, see: People v. Bynon, 146 Cal. App. 2d 7,
303 P. 2d 75 (1956). It is to be noted that the results of
the tests would be admissible to contradict a critical part
of her testimony about which she could not be mistaken.
See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954) § § 36, 47.
In Maryland, under 1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 12, § 20, in
effect since 1941, a defendant in a bastardy proceeding who
denies he is the father of a child has the right to demand
blood tests, but the statute "has no application whatever in
other classes of cases." See dictum in Shanks v. State, 185
Md. 437, 449, 45 A. 2d 85 (1945); see also Bowen, Blood
Tests and Disputed Parentage, 18 Md. L. Rev. 111 (1958).
In addition to bastardy proceedings, blood test results have
also been admitted in criminal cases to identify blood as
that of a particular person. Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640, 57
A. 2d 289 (1948); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954) § 177;
ANNO. 46 A.L.R. 2d 1000, 1025-27 (1956). Pursuant to MD.
RULES (1961) Rule 420, a Maryland court, in its discretion,
may order blood tests upon motion of any party, "[wihen-
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ever .. .the blood relationship of a party or of an agent
or a person in the custody or under the legal control of a
party, is material to any matter involved in any action.. .."
For further reference see: MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954)
§ 178; RICHARDSON, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1961) § 12.1 et
seq.; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 165a and § 165b
(theory of blood tests); 44 AM. Juny., Rape, § 71; ANNO. 46
A.L.R. 2d 1000 (1956).
Insurance - "Prearranged Race Or Competitive Speed
Test" In Automobile Liability Policy Limited To Commer-
cial Or Business Venture. Country Mutual Insurance Cm-
pany v. Bergman, ........ Ill ......., 185 N.E. 2d 513 (1962).
Testimony indicated defendant-insured and the driver of
another vehicle were "racing" automobiles on a highway
at the time an accident occurred. Plaintiff-insurer brought
action for a declaratory judgment that it was not required
to defend action against insured because of a clause in the
policy excluding coverage "to any automobile while used
as a public or livery conveyance, or while being operated
in any prearranged race or competitive speed test, or while
rented or leased to others." (Emphasis added.) After sub-
mitting the question of the meaning of the indicated phrase
to the jury, without instruction or guidance, the trial judge
set aside a verdict that insured was engaged in a prear-
ranged race or competitive speed test within the meaning
of the clause and found, as a matter of law, that the exclu-
sion referred only to sports contests providing profits,
awards or other gains to participants. On appeal, the Ap-
pellate Court of Illinois (viewing the clause as ambiguous)
affirmed and held, that since the other two activities de-
scribed in the same clause result in exclusion of coverage
only if the activity is of a commercial or business character
[on "public or livery conveyance", see 7 APPELMAN, INSUR-
ANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1962) §§ 4433-4435; 2 RICHARDS,
INSURANCE (5th ed. 1952) § 286; 5A AM. JUR., Automobile
Insurance, § 30; 12 M.L.E. 493, Insurance, § 195; ANNo. 30
A.L.R. 2d 273 (1953); and on "rented or leased to others",
see APPELMAN, supra, § 4436], it was reasonable to similarly
limit "prearranged race or competitive speed test."
Ambiguous language in a policy is generally strictly
construed against the insurer. See Penn., Etc., Ins. Co. v.
Shirer, 224 Md. 530, 168 A. 2d 525 (1961); 6 (Part I)
BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE (1945) § 3891; 12 M.L.E., Insurance, § 75. Language
sufficient to exclude coverage if the vehicle is used in "any
race or speed test" can readily be included in the policy.
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See Country Mutual Insurance Company v. Bergman,
supra, 517; APPELMAN, supra, § 4439 (note especially fn.
48). For further reference and discussion, see: APPELMAN,
supra, § 4255; BLASHFELD, supra, § 3591, n. 1; 45 C.J.S.,
Insurance, § 834; 12 M.L.E., Insurance, § 195.
Statutes - Maryland Unsatisfied Claim And Judgment
Fund - United States As Resident Of The State. United
States v. Whitcomb, 31 L.W. 2451 (4th Cir. 1963). The
United States obtained a judgment in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland against an un-
insured Maryland motorist for damage to a Post Office
truck. An application was filed, in the District Court, in
which the United States alleged it was entitled to be paid
out of the Maryland Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund
as a "qualified person" within the meaning of 6 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 662, § 158. Under 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66 ,
§ 150(g) the definition of "qualified person" includes a
resident of Maryland, and under subsection (i) "person"
includes governmental bodies. The District Court, in re-
jecting the contention, reasoned that although the United
States was a "person" within the act, it was not a "qualified
person" since it was not a resident of Maryland. In re-
versing, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the United
States was a resident of Maryland and entitled to payment
from the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund.
The Maryland Fund Act does not contain a definition of
"resident" and the Court of Appeals has held that the gen-
eral definition of that term in 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66 ,
§ 2 (Motor Vehicles - Definitions) is inapplicable to the
Fund sections. See Maddy v. Jones, 230 Md. 172, 176, 186
A. 2d 482 (1963). However, the court in the latter case
stated that "resident" within the scope of the statute meant
a domiciliary of Maryland. Supra, 179. The Circuit Court
of Appeals in interpreting the Maddy case, stated that the
United States was a domiciliary of Maryland insofar as a
governmental body could be described as a domiciliary.
See Vaughn v. Northup, 15 Pet. (40 U.S.) 1, 6, where the
Court stated: "[t]he United States, in their sovereign ca-
pacity, have no particular place of domicil, but possess, in
contemplation of law, a ubiquity throughout the Union
•.. ". It is to be noted that the Maryland Fund Law was
patterned after the New Jersey law (39 N.J.S.A. (Cum.
Supp. 1960) Tit. 39, Ch. 6, §§ 61-91) and the latter does not
include governmental bodies within the definition of "per-
son" which might lead to a result contrary to the instant
case.
